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One of the most important and disputed questions within the 
field of international mediation concerns the issue of bias. Can 
mediators be partial, sympathetic and supportive of one but not both 
of the main disputants, or should mediators always be neutral? Is it 
possible to be strictly impartial? Although neutrality is only one 
aspect of the mediators’ characteristics important to bringing about 
peaceful settlement of violent disputes, the question of bias cuts to 
the core of what mediation is and the ways in which mediators can 
help the parties reach peace. It is therefore crucial for academics and 
researchers, as well as policymakers and practitioners, to understand 
the occurrence, function, and effect of mediators’ bias in 
international conflict resolution processes. 
Summarizing the growing field of mediation research, Tom 
Woodhouse states:  
[a]s the literature on mediation has grown, and as 
knowledge has increased from an accumulating base 
of case studies and reflections, one of the most 
significant questions which has emerged is that related 
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to the relative merits . . . between two contrasting 
types of mediation: firstly that of a biased 
mediator . . . and secondly that of the unbiased 
mediator.1 
Yet, the issue of bias in international mediation is a complex 
one: a simple yes-or-no-answer to the question of whether mediators 
should be biased or neutral is not sufficient. It depends on a set of 
circumstances, which are discussed in this article. The question of 
mediation and bias is a core discussion within international mediation 
research.2 This article does not aim to summarize this rich research 
field, nor even explicitly situate my own work within this larger field. 
Its more limited ambition is instead to draw out the policy 
implications of my own empirically-based work on the role of bias in 
the mediation of internal armed conflicts.3 My main contribution to 
mediation research has been to explore the role of neutrality and bias 
in international peace diplomacy in civil wars. 
A first basic question to pose is whether mediators can be 
biased. If they are biased, do they not cease to be mediators? It is a 
common perception that mediation requires unbiased third parties. 
Some scholarly definitions require impartiality of the mediators, and 
hence, mediators are unbiased by definition. For instance, a classical 
                                                 
1 Tom Woodhouse, Adam Curle: Radical Peacemaker and Pioneer of Peace 
Studies, 1 J. OF CONFLICTOLOGY 1, 5-6 (2010). 
2 See generally I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN 
END TO CIVIL WARS 2-29 (1995); I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International 
Mediation, in LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A 
DIVIDED WORLD 437-454 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2007); Saadia Touval, 
Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations, 1 JERUSALEM J. OF INT’L 
REL. 51 (1975); Bernd Beber, International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of 
Bias, 29 CONFLICT MGMT. AND PEACE SCI. 397 (2012); Andrew Kydd, Which Side 
Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation, 47 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 597 (2003); Burcu 
Savun, Information, Bias, and Mediation Success, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 25 (2008). 
3 For work on bias in international conflicts, see generally Christopher 
Gelpi, Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control, in IMPERFECT UNIONS: SECURITY 
INSTITUTIONS OVER TIME AND SPACE 107 (Helga Haftendorn et al. eds., 1999); 
Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict 
Management Mechanisms, 28 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 124 (2011). See also 
Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2 PENN ST. 
J.L.& INT’L AFF. 66 (2013). 
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definition of mediation suggests that mediators have a relatively 
“impartial stance with regard to the opposing sides in a crisis.”4 Thus, 
by definition, impartiality is conceptually linked to mediation. Yet, 
with a definitional approach such as this, it is not possible to examine 
the extent to which bias helps or hinders peace processes. A more 
fruitful approach is to leave the question of bias as an open empirical 
question: to use mediator’s bias as an explanatory factor—that is, the 
degree and type of bias—and examine empirically the relationship 
between bias and how the process unfolds and the outcome is 
impacted. 
BIAS—AND ITS DIRECTION—MATTERS 
My research has shown that biased mediators, in some 
situations, outperform neutral mediators. Yet, in order to understand 
the role of bias in mediation, we first need to understand the context 
of contemporary armed conflicts. Most contemporary armed 
conflicts are fought between governments and rebel-groups.5 In other 
words, they are intrastate armed conflicts. Yet, until very recently, 
statistical analysis on mediation focused almost exclusively on 
interstate conflicts. Government and rebel-groups are different types 
of actors, a fact that implies that mediation plays a different type of 
role than in interstate conflicts, for the following basic reason: the 
government is internationally recognized, stronger in terms of 
capabilities and military might, and has many other obligations 
beyond pursuing a conflict with rebel groups. By contrast, rebel-
groups typically are unrecognized (and strive for recognition), 
materially weaker, but exclusively focused on achieving their 
aspirations in the conflict with the government-side. 
This also means that a mediator’s bias plays a different role 
depending on whether it is directed towards rebels or governments. I 
have suggested that there is a rebel-sided commitment problem, meaning 
that governments may fear giving recognition and power to rebels 
due to a belief that they will misuse it and exploit their advantaged 
                                                 
4 ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRISES 52 (1967). 
5 See generally PETER WALLENSTEEN, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION (2011). 
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positions. This commitment problem occurs primarily when parties 
are about to conclude negotiated peace deals (as opposed to that 
which occurs primarily in the implementation phase of agreements).6 
A negotiated settlement implies asymmetric opportunities for 
exploitation on the rebel-side, and rebel-groups therefore have 
commitment problems. They can, however, mitigate these problems 
by accepting a mediator that is biased for the other (government) 
side. In support of this reasoning, I found empirically—exploring 
data on mediation in internal armed conflicts during the time-period 
1989-2003—that government-biased mediators are particularly 
effective as peacemakers in bringing about negotiated settlements to 
armed conflicts.7 
Yet, not all peace settlements are the same and therefore 
should not be treated alike. Instead, peace settlements should be 
disaggregated into different peace institutional arrangements. When 
policymakers engage in crafting peace agreements, they need to ask 
themselves what type of peace they aspire to reach. Different types of 
mediators are associated with different types of institutional 
arrangements. I have found that rebel-biased mediators tend, in 
comparison with neutral mediators, to create peace settlements that 
include political-power sharing arrangements and third-party security 
guarantees. In contrast, government-biased mediators are more likely 
to create stipulations for government-sided amnesties, and territorial 
power-sharing arrangements. 
Furthermore, I argue that because biased mediators have 
incentives to protect their protégés, they will ensure that there are 
stronger mechanisms in the peace agreements. Exploring the content 
of all peace agreements since 1989, it becomes evident that biased 
mediators actually outperform neutral mediators in bringing about 
important institutional peace arrangements, such as stipulations for 
power-sharing, repatriation of civilians, and third-party security 
guarantees.8 This insight is important because it shows that biased 
                                                 
6 See BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE SUCCESSFUL 
SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL WARS 67 (2002). 
7 Isak Svensson, Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to 
Peace, 44 J. OF PEACE RES. 177, 183-85 (2007). 
8 Id. at 185, 187. 
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mediators are not only more likely to be successful in bringing about 
settlements, but also in some sense, produce “better” agreements.9 
Finally, it is also important to understand what makes biased 
third parties so effective. In previous work, I have identified four 
mechanisms that help explain the effectiveness of biased mediators: 
biased mediators can act (1) to protect their side, (2) reveal 
information, (3) deliver their side, and (4) counterbalance concession 
cheating.10 
This article calls into question some of the underlying 
assumptions in the contemporary international approach to conflict 
resolution. When it comes to the quality of peace, there is a 
difference between biased and neutral mediators. If we define quality 
in terms of stipulations of institutional arrangements that previous 
research has identified as important for deals to stick and peace to 
become durable, then biased mediators tend to be more effective in 
bringing high-quality agreements about.11 
One important, but insufficiently scrutinized issue regards the 
tension between justice-norms and peace-norms when it comes to 
biased and neutral mediators. Government-biased mediators tend to 
mediate agreements giving the government side freedom from 
persecution. This is good in the sense that it decreases the cost of 
peace for the belligerents—it is easier for decision-makers to agree to 
settle the conflict if they think they will not be punished for their 
wrongdoing during the war—and thereby make peace more likely to 
stick. Yet, it can also have a negative effect in the sense that it creates 
a culture of impunity by letting human-rights abusers go free. Biased 
mediators—under some circumstances—can be effective peace 
brokers, but their intervention may have negative implications for the 
values and protection of human rights. 
                                                 
9 Isak Svensson, Who Brings Which Peace?: Neutral versus Biased Mediation and 
Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars, 53 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 446, 449, 
464-65 (2009). 
10 Id. at 463. 
11 Id. at 461-62. 
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The policy implication of these global, comparative studies is 
that the direction of bias matters. When selecting mediators to 
negotiate a conflict assignment, policymakers must pay attention to 
which side a potential mediator has supported. In general, 
government-sided mediators outperform rebel-sided in terms of 
bringing about negotiated settlement,12 but to some extent (for 
instance, when it comes to political power-sharing and third-party 
security guarantees), it is the rebel-biased mediators that outperform 
government-biased ones.13 
THE ROLE FOR NEUTRAL MEDIATORS 
What then is the role for neutral mediators in peacemaking 
processes? Here four clarifications need to be made. First, although 
biased mediators, on an aggregate level, tend to be more effective 
than neutral ones, this does not necessarily mean that neutral 
mediators are unimportant. As with all social sciences, we are talking 
about probabilistic tendencies rather than general empirical laws. 
Neutral mediators are associated with negotiated settlements and can 
therefore also be important. Although they may bring agreements of 
less quality, they are nevertheless also engaged in bringing about 
negotiated settlements. Nothing we have concluded so far should 
lead us to disregard the role of neutral mediators. 
Second, there are transformations that need to occur in a 
peace process in addition to the peace agreements, and neutral 
mediators may be better positioned to support the creation of such 
transformations. It can be seen as a success to “just” get negotiations 
started.14 
                                                 
12 Svensson, supra note 7 at 181-83. 
13 Svensson, supra note 9 at 463-64; see also Molly M. Melin & Isak 
Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars, 35 
INT’L INTERACTIONS 249 passim (2009) (discussing how historical ties also help 
explain the occurrence of mediation, which plays out differently in international 
and intrastate settings). 
14 ISAK SVENSSON & PETER WALLENSTEEN, THE GO BETWEEN: JAN 
ELIASSON AND THE STYLES OF MEDIATION 56, 67-68 (2010). 
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Third, coalitions of biased and neutral mediators can be an 
effective design for peacemaking. The presence of third-party bias 
among any of the mediators as the critical value for defining a 
mediator as either biased or neutral implies that neutral mediators 
sometimes work in conjecture with biased ones, and in such 
collaborations might be particularly effective. 
Fourth, an important role for neutral mediators can be to 
bring on board potential mediators that will be biased due to their 
historical ties to one side, during the mediation process. For example, 
most informed observers would agree that peace between Israel and 
Palestine cannot be reached unless the U.S. engages as a peace 
broker. In fact, any progress that has been made in moving the 
parties’ positions towards each other has been made under American 
auspices. Sweden played an important role in the late 1980s in 
bringing about U.S. engagement in the process, by mediating, not 
between the primary parties, but between the secondary supporting 
actors to the government-side (the U.S.) and the rebel-side (the 
Palestine Liberation Organization). The Swedish approach—neutral 
mediation between the main secondary supporting actors—
transformed the U.S. engagement from support to peace-maker and 
thus structurally changed the relationships between the primary 
conflicting parties. This is in contrast to the direct engagement 
approach employed by the Norwegians in the same dispute—the 
Oslo Channel. The Norwegian approach was designed to engage 
directly with the primary parties, and although it reached a 
breakthrough and created a Palestinian Authority, it did not succeed 
in changing the underlying dynamics of the conflict. Rather, and 
perhaps counter-intuitively, many now view the Swedish approach as 
a more long-lasting achievement. 
INSIDER-PARTIAL MEDIATORS 
Another important policy implication to be drawn from the 
empirical research on mediation is the role of internal mediators: 
mediators emerged in the context of the conflicts and that culturally 
and positionally cannot be seen as strictly neutral. Domestic 
resources for peacemaking can be pivotal in peace processes. Most of 
the global, comparative research that has been done in the field of 
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mediation has focused on international mediators. Yet, mediators can 
also be insiders. Although Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach point 
this out in an important 1991 piece, surprisingly little systematic 
research has heeded their advice and included these types of peace-
actors in their analyses.15 Insiders commonly carry with them certain 
distinct resources, which can provide important advantages in peace 
processes.  
These insiders, I suggest, can be particularly useful in 
mitigating some of the informational problems that arise in conflict 
bargaining situations. Most notably: (1) insiders have access to 
information about the parties’ resolve and capability to an extent that 
outsiders would have difficulty obtaining; and (2) insiders have 
significant reputation concerns as they will continue to interact with 
the conflicting parties after the intervention whereas outsiders often 
leave the scene after their intervention. Given this proximity, insiders 
need to be more protective of their reputations, and can ill-afford to 
lie, bluff or misrepresent information to the parties. Their concern 
for their future reputation incentivizes them to be candid during 
talks.  
These factors should lead us to examine other types of third 
parties than those usually discussed in the literature. In particular, we 
need to explore the role of insiders such as religious representatives 
and civil society leaders in acting as peacemakers. An empirical 
analysis of the role of insiders shows that insiders increase the chance 
of reaching the conclusion of a negotiated settlement—but overall 
they tend to select the “easiest” conflict situations available.16 Studies 
along these lines have important policy ramifications, not least by 
underlining the need for developing domestic resources for 
peacemaking. 
                                                 
15 See generally  Paul Wehr & John Paul Lederach, Mediating Conflict in 
Central America, 28 J. PEACE RES. 85 (1991). 
16 Svensson, supra note 7. 
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PERCEPTIONS OF PARTIALITY 
To this point, bias has been discussed in terms of objective 
criteria: based on previous behavior (secondary support in terms of 
international mediators) or the mediator’s location within the conflict 
(insiders in non-armed conflicts). Yet, there are also subjective 
aspects to bias. How do parties in conflicts perceive the third-party 
mediators? Why are strictly neutral mediators sometimes perceived as 
biased? Intrastate armed conflicts involve parties that are not 
necessarily equally strong or share the same level of international 
recognition. They are, in other words, asymmetric in nature. 
Mediators that try to mediate in such an asymmetric context run the 
risk of becoming trapped in the dynamics and will commonly have 
problems appearing neutral. This is a dilemma that mediators of civil 
wars often face. Trying to act in an even-handed fashion will risk 
undermining the weaker side in the negotiations. On the other hand, 
trying to equalize the parties (thereby enabling a more productive 
peace process) runs the risk of having the mediators be perceived as 
coming out in support of one side of a conflict. Either way, the 
mediator risks being perceived as partial. Norway’s engagement in Sri 
Lanka is illustrative of this problem. By supporting the peace 
infrastructure of the Tamil Tigers organization, which was necessary 
for effective transformation of the conflict, Norway was perceived as 
more partial to the rebel-group than the Sinhalese majority.17 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Given the insights generated by the research on bias in 
mediation, what are the implications for policymakers? What are the 
policy lessons that can be drawn from this research? 
Three basic policy implications stand out. First, mediators 
with ties and a history of support to one side can play a valuable role 
in the process of negotiating peace in intrastate armed conflicts. 
Biased mediators have an important function, particularly when 
                                                 
17 Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson, ‘Damned if You Do, and Damned if 
You Don’t’: Nordic Involvement and Images of Third-Party Neutrality in Sri Lanka, 13 INT’L 
NEGOTIATION 341, 351 (2008). 
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getting conflicting parties to agree to concessions on the basic 
incompatible issues at the core of the conflict. 
Secondly, and more specifically, the direction of the bias 
matters: rebel-biased and government-biased mediators have 
different functions to play in intrastate peacemaking processes. 
Stipulations of particular peace institutional arrangements are 
associated with different types of biased mediators. 
This point also leads to a last general policy insight: the 
importance of a more disaggregated perspective on mediation 
outcome. Since peace agreements vary considerably in their content, 
policy must go beyond merely trying to get the parties to reach an 
agreement—it also matters what kind of agreement is reached. 
 
